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This paper provides an overview of how different approaches to improving public sector 
management relate to so-called core or essential public health functions such as disease 
surveillance, health education, monitoring and evaluation, workforce development, enforcement 
of public health laws and regulations, public health research, and health policy development. The 
paper summarizes key themes in the public management literature and draws lessons for their 
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Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of how various approaches to improving public sector 
management relate to the so-called core or essential public health functions (EPHFs) such as 
disease surveillance, health education, monitoring and evaluation, workforce development, 
enforcement of public health laws and regulations, public health research, and health policy 
development (IOM 1987; PAHO 2002). Its purpose is to summarize key themes in the public 
management literature and draw lessons for the EPHFs. Section I summarizes “new public 
management” approaches. Section II reviews traditional approaches to public administration and 
their relevance to the EPHFs. Section III summarizes lessons in point form. 
Two points are essential to understanding the discussion that follows. The first relates to 
the economic nature of the EPHFs. In economic terms, most EPHFs are public goods. This means 
that they are non-rival (i.e., consumption by one person doesn’t preclude consumption by 
another) and non-exclusionary (i.e., their benefits accrue to the entire population and can’t be 
restricted to a discrete group). For example: once erected, a health education billboard benefits 
everyone who views it, no matter how many people do so (i.e., non-rival); and anyone who wants 
to view it can, given its public location (i.e., non-exclusionary). This is distinct from private 
goods—e.g., cancer treatment—which, like most commodities, are both rival and exclusionary. 
Some disease control services fall into a middle category because they have both private and 
public characteristics. Immunization is one example. While immunization has private benefits for 
the vaccinated individual, it also has public benefits because of its contribution to herd immunity 
and the protection of others. The same is true of TB treatment, which benefits the sick individual 
but also reduces the chances he will infect others—i.e., an external benefit (externality) in 
addition to the private benefit. These distinctions are not purely academic. They have major 
implications on how services should be financed and delivered and are fundamental to the 
discussion below. 
The second point relates to the difference between public health services and public 
health functions. Many traditional public health services—immunization, std clinics, TB control 
etc.—are merit goods; the public health functions, however—policymaking, disease surveillance, 
population health assessment, health education etc.—are almost all pure public goods. The 
service-function distinction is not always made clear in the literature but is of considerable 
practical relevance when it comes to questions of management and financing. Public health 
services are often relatively easy to measure, e.g., with indicators such as the number of children 
immunized or the number of TB cases treated. This makes them easier to manage and provides a 
wider scope for innovations in service delivery compared to public health functions, whose public 
good nature of complexity of measurement pose special challenges. As such, the public health    
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functions are more akin to other “core government functions”—e.g., revenue collection, 
maintaining law and order—and draw on similar principles for their management.
1  
 
Section I. The New Public Management 
Until the early 1980s, the public sector in most countries was monopolistic, centralized, 
hierarchical, inflexible, unresponsive to users and insulated from the private sector and other 
agencies outside government. With budget crises and the realization of significant inefficiencies 
in the public sector in the early 1980s, and with the coincident rise in theories and disciplines 
such as public choice theory, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics, it was 
recognized that traditional approaches to public administration were in need of reform. A range of 
reforms—collectively referred to as the new public management or NPM—rapidly formed a new 
model of state management. At the heart of these reforms was a shift from government by control 
to government by contract. This typically involved changes in organizational structure (e.g., 
moves toward managerial autonomy or corporatization of public entities) and introduction of 
market processes (e.g., through formal privatization or market-simulating reforms within the 
public sector, such as purchaser-provider splits and decentralization), and it came to imply a 
redefinition in the government’s role from that of direct service provider to one of stewardship, 
oversight and regulation (Batley 1999a). The poster-country for these reforms was New Zealand, 
where sweeping reforms were carried out in the late 1980s—sparing no sector—and which 
remains as the most comprehensive example of a NPM-motivated reform process to date (Bale and 
Dale 1998). 
The concepts of NPM resonated with health policy specialists and had a major influence 
on health reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. In most cases the reform effort made no distinction 
between curative and preventive services and applied similar prescriptions to both. Some 
concepts—such as purchaser-provider splits, hospital autonomy and decentralization—were 
effective and took hold for curative services. The greatest success was reported in industrialized 
countries with high levels of administrative capacity and political stability, such as Singapore and 
New Zealand, though developing countries such as Ghana, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
also attempted them to various degrees (Russell, Bennett, and Mills 1999). For public health and 
preventive services, however, impact evaluations—which weren’t conducted until the late 
1990s—revealed a less positive picture. In this section we examine new public management 
strategies for public health under three headings: true market reforms, i.e., those involving user 
charges and provider competition; pseudo-market reforms, e.g., purchaser-provider splits, 
contracting and other market-simulating reforms; and decentralization. 
 
                                                      
1 For a more general discussion of issues of public management for service delivery, see the recent 
World Development Report (World Bank 2003). 
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Market Reforms I: Creating a Real Market by Charging Clients 
The negative impact of user fees on preventive services has been abundantly 
documented. User fees have been shown to cause immunization coverage rates to fall (WHO 
1999). The same has happened with other disease control activities. In Nicaragua, for example, 
reductions in the government budget for malaria control led some areas to adopt user charges for 
diagnosis and treatment, a practice that had been proscribed since 1947; these in turn led to a fall 
in the numbers being tested and a consequent rise in malaria incidence (Garfield 1999). 
For the EPHFs, user charges are not an option. Consumers will not voluntarily pay for 
disease surveillance or health education campaigns, given their public good nature. (This explains 
why tax financing is used to pay for these services.) But in some countries, severe reductions in 
the budget for public health have forced public health agencies to generate their own revenues by 
any means possible. Some responded by seeking donor funds to support public health. Others 
used within-facility cross-subsidies from curative care to public health services, though this was 
only effective when the two services were jointly managed and when a high level of commitment 
to public health was present.  
In China, however, no such compensations were provided. In the early 1980s China 
embarked on a radical program of economic reforms. The reform program included introduction 
of service charges in health facilities to make up for reductions in budgetary support from the 
government, and a laissez-faire attitude toward competition between providers, including 
providers at different levels in the service hierarchy. The idea was to improve efficiency by 
exposing health facilities to competitive market pressures. Reforms were applied to all health 
agencies, curative and public health alike. By the mid-1990s government budgetary support 
covered only salaries at health facilities and provided nothing for operating costs. These were 
supposed to be covered by revenues from the facility itself. The impact of this incentive 
environment on curative care has been well documented.
2  
A recent study evaluated the impact of these reforms on public health and preventive 
services (Liu and Mills 2002). It found mixed but generally negative results. Inter-level 
competition led to a decline in information-sharing and technical assistance between public health 
agencies at township, district and province levels, with negative consequences for disease 
surveillance and training opportunities for lower-level staff. The need to generate revenues led to 
an underprovision of public goods (surveillance, health education, preventive services) and a bias 
toward high-revenue services such as fee-based health inspections; reduced efficiency by causing 
duplicate inspections from public health agencies at different levels—each of them motivated by 
the need to generate revenues—and a general overprovision of inspections; and had negative 
equity effects because of agencies’ tendency to focus on profitable enterprises rather than 
carrying out inspections across the board. The most significant finding was a fall in the provision 
                                                      
2 Zheng and Hillier 1995; Liu and Hsiao 1995; Bloom and Xingyuan 1997; Bloom 1998, Wang and 
Cai 2003.    
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of public preventive services that could not be charged for, including outbreak investigation and 
response, preventive programs such as immunization and vector control, monitoring of diseases 
and health status, and health education programs. Since the government budget provided only for 
salaries, public health agencies had to cross-subsidize provision of these services from revenues 
generated through profitable activities such as health inspections. Not surprisingly, most agencies 
did not do so consistently. A MOH report in 1993 found that for non-revenue generating services, 
more than 80 percent of public health agencies were performing below expected standards; a third 
were provided at less than half the required level. 
 
Market Reforms II: Simulating Markets 
A second category of NPM-inspired reforms involved the use of market principles within 
the public sector and the promotion of public-private links. The usual process involves creating a 
split between purchasing and provision; using output-based contracts for which private and public 
firms compete (rather than input-based financing of public agencies alone); devolving managerial 
autonomy; and experimenting with incentive payments and other ways of improving worker 
productivity. The motivation was to improve efficiency by introducing market competition and 
reducing the monopoly power of government agencies. We discuss each separately. 
Splitting and contracting. “Splitting” refers to the creation of separate agencies to 
purchase and provide services, the former contracting with the latter on the basis of expected 
outputs rather than controlling it in a hierarchical way. “Contracting” includes not only public-
public contracts, as in the case of purchaser-provider splits wholly within the public sector, but 
also to the use of private firms or providers to deliver government services—sometimes in 
competition with public providers—through contracts with a purchasing entity. In both cases the 
idea is to move away from public management via hierarchical control and toward management 
by contract.  
Splitting purchasing from provision has several effects. By separating the two functions, 
it allows purchaser and provider agencies to each concentrate on their area of comparative 
advantage; it forces purchasers to be explicit about what they want from service providers; and it 
helps purchasers hold providers to account. It also allows private companies to compete for 
public contracts, in principle improving efficiency. Some countries have taken the concept to 
great lengths. In New Zealand, even the military is divided into a purchaser, the Ministry of 
Defense, and a provider, the Defense Forces. In this case the motivation was not to introduce 
competitive pressures, since there is still only one provider, but rather to improve accountability 
relationships and make explicit the government’s expectations of the military (Bale and Dale 
1998). 
These reforms have also be implemented in developing countries, though not as 
extensively as originally thought (Russell, Bennett, and Mills 1999). Implementing a government 
by contract approach requires strong management capacity and good information systems and can    
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impose significant administrative costs, particularly for services where measurement is difficult. 
Contracting is only effective when outputs can be clearly specified and performance clearly 
measured (Bennett and Mills 1998). Contract specification must be clear, information must be 
available for monitoring purposes, and an arms-length relationship must exist between 
government and provider (Batley 1999). While this may be the case for some preventive 
services—immunization, cold chain management, campaign-based activities or nutrition 
interventions such as those reported by Marek and others (1999) in Senegal and Madagascar—it 
is not the case for most EPHFs. Why? First, because measuring performance in the EPHFs is 
complex, costly and requires strong information systems; and second, because contract 
management of this sort requires technical and administrative capacities that are weakly 
developed in many countries. 
Functions such as surveillance are so complex and spread-out that monitoring a private 
contractor would be a costly exercise—however good the indicators chosen—and might lead to 
principal-agent related efficiency losses such as those observed when hard-to-monitor services 
are decentralized (Hurley, Birch, and Eyles 1995). Effective monitoring also requires a high level 
of technical capacity within government, without which contractors will take advantage of the 
government and fail to be held accountable in classic principal-agent fashion. A common 
argument for contracting in developing countries is therefore circular: since capacity is low in 
government, contracting out to the private sector is an option; but for contracting to work well, 
capacity needs to be high. Given the limited capacity of many developing country governments—
even in the most basic areas of administration such as billing, recording etc.—their ability to 
write, monitor and enforce contracts for complex services is likely to be very limited indeed. 
Contracting should therefore be approached with care and not as a substitute for strengthening the 
capacity of government itself. Given the high transaction and monitoring costs involved, 
efficiency gains are unlikely. Batley (1999) writes: 
 
Particularly in the social sectors…where government retains critical ultimate 
responsibilities, the transaction costs of radical reforms which create multiple agencies 
are likely to outweigh the efficiency gains of “unbundling.” More modest ambitions and 
simpler reforms which avoid the creation of complex, interdependent organizational 
arrangements are more likely to have beneficial effects. 
  
Managerial autonomy. Essential to effective “management by contract” is giving line 
managers the autonomy to fulfill their contracts however they see best. Thus, as part of NPM 
reforms, governments not only drew up contracts for public agencies that specified outputs rather 
than inputs; they also gave their managers the autonomy to manage inputs and human resources 
and develop implementation strategies without interference. In some countries this involved 
legislative changes to place public agencies under corporate law and remove them from civil 
service rules.    
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Given the complexity of contract-based approaches for the EPHFs, is managerial 
autonomy relevant to these services or not? The answer is a qualified yes—not because of its NPM 
connections but because of the stifling effect of centralized, command-and-control management 
on service delivery in general. Governance arrangements in many developing countries provide 
little if any autonomy to line managers. This has at least two harmful effects: it deprives 
managers of the freedom to adapt services to local conditions and to manage staff and resources 
flexibly, and it hinders the development of general management skills in the public sector. 
Standard rationales for limiting managerial autonomy are to ensure consistent policy 
implementation and prevent corruption. However, severe restrictions on managerial autonomy—
which exist in many countries—frequently go beyond what is necessary to achieve these. This 
frequently goes unrecognized by central-level managers and policymakers. In India, for example, 
80 percent of district health managers said that having more autonomy would help them do their 
job better, while their superiors at the state level consistently thought they had enough autonomy 
already (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). Grindle (1997) points out that a certain 
degree of autonomy—especially in personnel matters—can help managers develop a positive 
organizational climate and is consistently associated with good performance. Giving managers 
the scope to experiment with resource allocation and financing might help ease the problems 
associated with fiscal centralization, such as the irregularity of transfers and disruptions in paying 
staff or suppliers (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). It might also promote innovation, 
which is otherwise constrained by managers’ perception of their superiors’ disapproval. But too 
much autonomy can also be a dangerous thing, leading not only to policy fragmentation and self-
serving behavior by managers but also imposing high transaction costs (Batley 1999). 
That said, each type of service will have its own balance. For some, such as law 
enforcement and provider accreditation, where conformity and consistency are essential, 
managerial autonomy may need to be circumscribed. The same may also be true where public 
goods or significant externalities are involved, since delegation may lead these to be ignored in 
the same way as decentralization does (see below). But for others—investigating health hazards, 
building community health profiles, providing health education and mobilizing community 
partnerships. among others—moderately widening the scope of managers’ authority can promote 
innovation and improve the adaptation of services to local circumstances without compromising 
the essential integrity of the function or impeding the need for consistency in core areas (e.g., 
notifiable diseases, basic reporting systems etc.). 
Experience with managerial autonomy is an essential precondition for the introduction of 
more complex administrative reforms later. But wide-ranging autonomy should not be introduced 
into public sectors characterized by informality and weak rule-enforcement, since autonomy in 
these contexts can lead to abuse. As rules and formality are established in the public sector, 
autonomy can be gradually expanded. As Schick (1998) points out, drawing lessons from the 
New Zealand model: 
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…no country should move directly from an informal public sector [i.e., one in which the 
deficiency of formal systems is made up by informal behavior, e.g., low pay is 
compensated by weak monitoring of absenteeism or the taking of informal payments] to 
one in which managers are accorded enormous discretion to hire and spend as they see 
fit. New Zealand did not make this leap, and neither should other countries. Before 
reform New Zealand operated under budgets that controlled spending and corresponded 
to actual transactions; it also had a civil service system that governed how public 
employees were hired and paid. In other words, it had a formal public sector. This is an 
essential precondition for adopting elements of the New Zealand model [i.e., of extensive 
NPM-inspired managerial reforms]. 
Improving productivity via performance incentives. A third strategy involves the use of 
performance-linked pay, bonuses and other financial incentives to influence provider behavior. A 
large literature exists on provider payment methods in the curative sector, but these methods do 
not transfer easily to public health services for several reasons. It is easier to measure curative 
services than public health ones, and incentive systems can therefore be linked to outputs more 
easily. This is not true of all public health services—immunization, family planning and mass 
Vitamin A supplementation do have measurable outputs, for example—but for public health 
functions, the complexity of their measurement makes it difficult to incentivize performance. The 
use of targets even for measurable public health services is not without problems. False reporting 
is common and often intensifies when target achievement is linked to incentives (UNICEF 1996). 
This can push up monitoring costs which in turn can outweigh the expected productivity gains 
associated with the incentive scheme in the first place: or in the absence of effective monitoring, 
it can lead staff to redirect their attention away from service delivery and toward data 
manipulation, thus reducing effectiveness. So while targets are useful for short-term, focused, 
disease-specific campaigns—and should be used with caution even there—they can be 
problematic for the more diffuse, long-term action required of the EPHFs. An alternative strategy 
to measure performance—the use of health outcomes—is also problematic, given the time lags 
involved and the presence of many confounding variables.  
Public health activities also require extensive collaboration between staff—in contrast to 
curative care, where much depends on the provider’s behavior alone—and incentive schemes 
focused on individuals can therefore have a negative impact on effectiveness by reducing 
information-sharing and cooperative behavior. The example of China is instructive in this regard. 
When public health agencies were forced to compete, their willingness to share information and 
work collaboratively declined—and with it their ability to carry out surveillance, health 
promotion and other joint activities effectively (Liu and Mills 2002). On a more positive note, 
Vietnam’s recent experience with shared incentives in commune health stations—where bonuses 
accrued from curative service delivery are shared with public health staff, and where the 
performance of public health staff reflects on the station’s ability to win awards and recognition 
from central and provincial health authorities—seems to have worked well. (An important 
distinction is that in Vietnam, public health services receive their operating funds separately from 
curative services, via direct central grants, and are not cross-subsidized from curative care 
revenues as they are in China. Without a dependency relationship between the two services,    
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cooperative incentives become easier to implement.) Examples from Taiwan and Korea show that 
group-wide incentives work well for public health staff (Sung and others 2003; Yu and others 
2003). In both countries, central health agencies use competitions, non-monetary awards and 
group recognition to encourage good performance by public health units. These incentives, 
combined with the respected technical authority of the granting agencies and their reputation for 
fairness in making awards, have institutionalized efforts to perform well and are weighted toward 
organizational behaviors conducive to effective public health action—e.g., collaboration, team-
work, information-sharing, etc.—rather than toward focused targets that might have the opposite 
effect (Khaleghian and Das Gupta 2003). Wade’s (1997) account of irrigation workers in Korea 
provides similar illustrations, as does Tendler and Freedheim’s (1994) account of health workers 
in Céara, Brazil.  
Incentives aren’t everything, of course (Gauri 2001). However good the incentive 
scheme, workers can still lose motivation because of other aspects of their work environment. For 
example, many authors attribute India’s shortcomings in public health to its reliance on targets as 
a way of motivating and measuring health worker behavior (Nair and others 2001). But equally 
important are public sector practices that limit the flexibility of district health managers to 
allocate their budgets or reward their staff, reduce worker motivation by subjecting them to 
erratic disbursements in pay, provide little opportunity for workers’ professional development or 
recognition , enforce rules of conduct unfairly, and make it so difficult to fire poorly performing 
workers that few incentives remain for workers to perform at their best (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, 
and Sarwal 2003). Not surprisingly, these lead public health efforts such as immunization, disease 
surveillance and health promotion—all of which depend heavily on the cooperation and 
performance of a far-flung workforce—to fail. 
These points lead to three conclusions. The first is that for performance pay to be useful 
for the EPHFs, measurement indicators need to be chosen carefully. Complex instruments, while 
accurate, may be unworkable and costly; while instruments that are too simple may increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior and have other perverse effects. Second, they suggest that 
performance incentives in public health should be team- or network-based rather than 
individualized, given the importance of collaboration. And third, they highlight the role that non-
financial incentives—recognition, training opportunities etc.—can play in encouraging good 
performance in a sustainable way. 
 
Decentralization 
Decentralization was a common theme in health and public sector reforms in the 1990s 
and remains this way today. Its proposed benefits center on the fact that it brings decisionmaking 
processes closer to the community and thereby improves the quality of information available to 
local decision makers, ensures that local decisions are relevant and adapted to local needs, and 
improves the ability of the public to hold decision makers and their agents (i.e., public officials) 
accountable. But the realization of these benefits has not been universal. In some countries,    
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decentralization has led to corruption and elite capture because of inadequate checks and balances 
at the local level. In others, local decision makers—unconstrained because of the lack of 
accountability mechanisms at the local level—have continued much as they did before, showing 
greater allegiance to central superiors than to local representatives. In many others, local officials 
have found themselves without the basic administrative capacity to take on their new roles, 
leading to failures in service delivery and the basic functions of government. In yet others, 
decentralization policies have weakened central government agencies to the extent that their 
corrective hands are tied, leading to policy fragmentation, an inability to take residual 
responsibility when jurisdictions fail, and an inability to adjust for inter-jurisdictional inequalities. 
In addition to these capacity and institutional prerequisites, a further set of conditions is 
necessary for decentralization to be successful. These relate to the nature of the activity being 
decentralized. Put simply, activities and services that are “visible” to the public, that have direct, 
measurable benefits to individuals and for which the public is prepared and able to express wants 
and preferences tend to fare better under decentralization than others. School management is one 
example. Since parents have a vested interest in the effectiveness of their schools, and since they 
are able—even if without perfect accuracy—to judge the quality of the school’s activities, 
devolving the responsibility for schools to a local government can be an effective strategy, as can 
introducing community co-management in the form of school boards (Jimenez and Sawada 1999, 
Filmer 2002). But many services do not have these characteristics. This is very much the case 
with the EPHFs, which are either invisible (surveillance), hard to measure (most EPHFs) or have 
benefits that are difficult to quantify for individual communities and are therefore neglected by 
rationally self-interested local authorities (again, most EPHFs). Akin, Hutchinson and Strumpf 
(2001) summarize this argument as follows: 
 
“[Theoretical models predict that] decentralization can lead to an increased government 
provision of private goods at the expense of public goods. This is because local 
governments ignore the spillover benefit of public goods to neighboring governments or 
are less subject to demands of international aid agencies who pressure for public goods 
projects. But perhaps more importantly, it is because when private type goods are 
allowed to be chosen, local citizens will behave rationally. They will reveal preferences 
for goods that most benefit them directly. Thus the argument goes that very decentralized 
provision of goods by governments, in which local citizens push for choices given a 
budget constraint, will often lead to a revealed preference problem similar to the one that 
leads to the necessity for public provision to begin with. Small governments will tend to 
vote to provide the goods for which citizens reveal preferences. They will therefore tend 
to spend on private goods type curative care clinic visits rather than on public goods type 
services such as health education and communicable disease control. Small governments 
may, therefore, behave too much like individuals, with the residents not revealing their 
preferences for public goods but in fact for private goods provided publicly. The 
hypotheses from the model, therefore, suggest that, in contrast to the conventional 
wisdom, decentralization of allocation decisions for services such as health care may in 
fact reduce societal welfare.”  
Khaleghian (2003) illustrates this with reference to immunization programs:    
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[Another] prediction is that community participation, especially in resource allocation 
decisions, may have a negative impact on immunization programs. The reasons for this 
are not difficult to understand. Communities, faced with a multitude of pressing needs 
and generally unaware of the value of immunization, may consider immunization to be a 
low priority among the various other goods and services—including curative health 
services—which their local authorities can provide. In the absence of other incentives 
(such as strong central pressure or financial controls), local authorities may respond to 
these preferences by allocating funding away from immunization—and may not in any 
case be held accountable for its provision by the community, whether directly or through 
electoral mechanisms—and local immunization programs may suffer as a result. Even 
with central pressure and oversight, however, the principal-agent relationship between 
local and central authorities may lead to the same conclusion, with local authorities 
neglecting central requirements and responding more strongly to local preferences 
instead.  
Published accounts tend to confirm these expectations. In Uganda, local governments 
spent less on public and semi-public goods after decentralization than before it, with a 
consequent underprovision of essential public health services such as immunization 
(Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf 2001). In the Philippines, decentralization shifted the 
balance of health expenditures away from prevention and toward curative care (Solon and 
others 1999 cited in Soerojo and Wilson 2001). In Nicaragua, local authorities ignored 
central directives to allocate 46 percent of their health expenditures to primary health care 
and instead allocated larger shares to secondary care, with immunization coverage in the 
affected districts falling by up to 50 percent in three years (Birn, Zimmerman, and 
Garfield 2000). In Indonesia, tight competition from other sectors led local mayors to 
abandon their commitment that 15 percent of their budgets should go to health (World 
Bank 2001a, cited in Soerojo and Wilson 2001). Similar phenomena have been noted in 
Tanzania (Gilson and Mills 1995), Uganda (Jeppson and Okuonzi 2000) and Colombia 
(Muñoz-Nates 1999, cited in WHO 1999). 
This raises a dilemma for the EPHFs. On one hand, many of the EPHFs need local 
adaptation and tailoring to be most effective, and can not be implemented in a rigid, centrally 
determined way. This is especially true in large and diverse countries with inter-jurisdictional 
differences in language, culture or epidemiological profile. On the other hand, decentralization—
in the sense of formally transferring the responsibility for these functions to local government—
seems not to work well either. Different approaches have been used to resolve this dilemma. 
Some countries have retained central management of the EPHFs but established field offices to 
adapt and tailor them to local needs. This was the prevailing pattern before the 1980s, when the 
dominant model of decentralization in developing countries was deconcentration to field staff 
rather than devolution to independent local governments (Manor 1999). The advantage of this 
approach is that it preserves inter-jurisdictional consistency and prevents local neglect of invisible 
services (or those that don’t bring in more votes); but its disadvantage is that bureaucratic rigidity 
frequently sets in and local adaptation fails to materialize. The reasons for this frequently center 
around a lack of managerial autonomy, as described earlier. The other method—which has 
become more common in recent years as countries have adopted wide-ranging devolutionary 
policies, sometimes as part of structural adjustment efforts—has been to compensate for local 
control of the EPHFs by retaining a measure of central influence through financial controls, e.g., 
grants-in-aid or earmarked funds. This is typically a “second best” solution implemented after the 
EPHFs have been devolved, because reversal of decentralization policies seldom occurs (Manor    
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1999; Dillinger 1994); and it faces a number of implementation problems in developing countries, 
not least of them being the difficulty faced by central health authorities—themselves reduced in 
strength and number by decentralization policies that typically reduce the size of central 
government—in monitoring the activity of local governments. So while formal devolution makes 
adaptation more likely, it makes central oversight more difficult and in turn can have a negative 
impact on the effectiveness of surveillance, health promotion and other efforts.  
As implied above, the decision on which path to take is seldom a rational one, since 
decentralization is a political reform motivated principally by non-technical considerations (Smith 
1997). The implications for the EPHFs therefore differ according to the path chosen to local 
political factors, including political factors within the health sector (Collins 1989). Several 
generic issues do emerge. First, the economic characteristics of the EPHFs make them inherently 
poor candidates for devolution to local government control, particularly when local governments 
are weak. Even if this devolution occurs, it should not be accompanied by full fiscal 
responsibility for these functions, since the incentive environment facing local governments—
even in industrialized countries such as the United States—typically leads to underfinancing of 
these functions. Second, and irrespective of the path chosen, decentralization policies should not 
be allowed to reduce the strength or capacity of central government agencies concerned with the 
EPHFs. Without strong central oversight, whether of deconcentrated field offices or of health 
officials in local government, the delivery of key public health functions will suffer. Central 
public health staff serve a number of important functions. In addition to receiving and interpreting 
information for the benefit of policy makers, they also have an inter-jurisdictional perspective 
necessary for effective coordination in disease control and play an important role in providing 
technical assistance and overseeing the activity of health staff at subnational levels (Das Gupta, 
Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). If these functions are compromised—as they very often are in 
decentralizing reforms, where the size of central government is reduced across the board and 
Ministries find themselves shrunk to a fraction of their former size—the EPHFs will fare poorly. 
Third, effective management of EPHFs—whether in a deconcentrated or devolved setup—requires 
better measurement instruments and attention to management. The management issues have been 
summarized already and will not be repeated here, except to highlight their special importance in 
administering a far-flung workforce (as in deconcentration). The measurement issues, however, 
are critical in both cases, since they condition the ability of central health authorities to effectively 
monitor, manage and support their subordinates in both hierarchical (deconcentration) or indirect 
(devolution) forms. In the latter case, the issue of measurement assumes added importance 
because of its links to central funds and the need to monitor how these funds have been used.  
Section II: A Return to the Old Public Management? 
Given the extent of market failures in the health sector—particularly for public health 
functions—and the limited administrative capacity of governments in most developing countries, 
the role of NPM-inspired reforms is limited and a return to the “old public management” appears 
necessary on the surface. This does not imply that public health should be managed in a    
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centralized, bureaucratic and unresponsive way. It just means that other approaches to 
strengthening management need to be found, ones that take into account the economic 
characteristics of the public health functions and focus on improving their delivery by the 
government itself. This section summarizes three such approaches: management capacity 
building; reforms to improve organizational climate; and efforts to improve performance by 
improving accountability, both hierarchically within government and externally to the public and 
civil society.  
Management Capacity Building  
Russell, Bennett and Mills (1999) highlight the limited capacity of service managers in 
developing countries and give examples of how even basic administrative tasks—such as record-
keeping and paying suppliers etc.—are carried out poorly and inconsistently in some countries 
(Marek and others 1999). Strengthening these capacities is a necessary precondition for 
improving management: hence, perhaps, the affection of donors for training activities and 
management-strengthening exercises. But this kind of direct, training-oriented capacity building 
is not sufficient; changes in the broader administrative context are also necessary. In many 
countries, unit managers are forced to make repeated visits to superiors in the capital city to gain 
approval for basic administrative functions such as releasing pay and signing leave forms 
(Nchinda 2003). This is not an evidence of weak administrative capacity but rather reflects 
weaknesses in administrative systems and rules—the weakest areas being finance, accounting and 
human resource management (Russell, Bennett, and Mills 1999)—which are equally important 
targets for corrective intervention. Similarly, the lack of general management skills is not always 
a reflection of poor training; it just as often reflects centralized decisionmaking structures and 
rigid civil service rules that deprive managers of the opportunity to develop these skills, often in 
spite of numerous donor-sponsored training activities. In sum, if the institutional environment 
prevents trained managers from exercising their newly developed skills, these managers will 
either leave the public sector, lose their skills or use them for personal rather than organizational 
gain (e.g., by covering the tracks of corrupt activity more effectively). 
 
One area of specific relevance to the EPHFs is the ability of managers to collaborate 
across agency lines (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). Many public health functions rely 
on coherent, coordinated action by a number of agencies—surveillance agencies, local 
governments, water boards, private medical providers etc.—and break down when this 
collaboration is weak. The ability to collaborate is not an inherent quality of managers; indeed 
public choice theorists believe that managers actually have the reverse incentive, i.e., to compete 
with other agencies and expand their own turf. The negative impact of this kind of behavior on 
public health functions is obvious. Reversing it requires a combination of direct interventions, 
e.g., sensitizing managers to the importance of collaboration, and institutional changes that 
facilitate it, e.g., joint strategies, formal collaborative relationships, staff exchanges, and incentive 
structures that encourage rather than inhibit teamwork (Chen and others 2003, Sung and others    
  13
2003). Experience with these interventions is fairly limited, as most attempts to promote inter-
agency collaboration involve statements of intent but not the institutional changes necessary to 
back them up. 
Batley (1999) points out that many countries, some of them encouraged by technical 
enthusiasts in the donor community, jumped directly into complex second-generation 
administrative reforms (e.g., purchaser-provider splits, contracting out etc.) without strengthening 
administrative skills and general management first. Not surprisingly, these reforms failed. Schick 
(1998), drawing lessons from New Zealand’s reform process, recommends that management-
strengthening efforts in developing countries should involve a series of steps, beginning first with 
improving the basic elements of public management and strengthening internal controls and only 
later moving toward more adventurous second-generation reforms. He writes: 
 “…politicians and officials must be able to concentrate on the basic process of public 
management. They must be able to control inputs before they are called upon to control 
outputs; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account for cost; 
they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to make their own rules; they 
most operated in integrated, centralized departments before being authorized to go it 
alone in autonomous agencies. 
Once the basics have been mastered, the public sector should be organized according to 
the principles of internal control. External control and New Zealand-type managerial 
discretion are not the only options for organizing governmental operations. Internal 
control is a third possibility.” 
This implies several things for the EPHFs. First, it suggests that training programs for 
managers will by themselves be insufficient to sustainably improve performance. Second, it 
shows how complex administrative reforms can only be implemented on a foundation of good 
general management. And third, it illustrates the substantial effect which institutional context—
that is, the formal and informal rules that govern relationships and behavior of public agents, 
including rules on recruitment, promotion, managerial autonomy etc.—can have on managers’ 
ability to gain and use their skills. Put simply, efforts to strengthen management of the EPHFs 
would need to go beyond training to also consider changes in the institutional environment, or if 
change isn’t possible, finding ways to insulate programs from its harmful elements. We next 
discuss two approaches relevant to the latter point: changes in organizational culture and methods 
to improve accountability. 
Organizational Culture and Institutional Context 
Training efforts are necessary but not sufficient for improving public management. 
Similarly, public sector reforms focused on pay, staffing levels and government reorganization 
alone do not succeed in fostering the changes in work attitudes, ethics and organizational culture 
that are necessary if significant performance improvements are to be realized (Lindauer and 
Nunberg 1994). Some of these changes are actually antithetical to the work attitudes necessary 
for effective action, such as when competition is introduced to services such as disease 
surveillance for which inter-provider cooperation is essential, as has happened in China (Liu and 
Mills 2002). Grindle (1997) hypothesizes that the “missing link” in public sector reforms is a    
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focus on organizational culture. She defines this as “a shared set of norms and behavioral 
expectations characterizing a corporate identity” and uses case studies from five high-performing 
public institutions in developing countries to illustrate its dimensions. According to Grindle, the 
idea that organizational culture can stimulate good performance goes against popular models of 
bureaucratic behavior. Rational choice and principal-agent models assume self-serving behavior 
on the part of public officials and their workers and are good at explaining why things go wrong. 
But they are less effective at explaining why in some organizations, things go right—and why 
workers in these organizations conform to the public interest model of “principled” agents 
working in the public interest. As Stiglitz (1999) points out,  
The problem is that the wrong lessons have been drawn out of those empirical and case 
studies showing the failures of government programs in the past. Yes, government 
programs may not work and they may fail to deliver services to the very poor, but this 
does not necessarily mean that government programs cannot work. The objective should 
have been to inquire into what caused the failures and to ask how those failures can be 
averted. Only if one could be convinced that there was something inherent about public 
provision that made failure inevitable—and that this failure was worse than the market 
failures being addressed—should one lose hope. Too often, the public failures can be 
easily traced to inadequate incentives; governments need to recognize that incentives 
apply to them too, and not just to markets. 
Grindle (1997) identifies four factors consistently associated with good performance in 
public organizations: a sense of organizational mission, defined as a widely held sense of purpose 
within the organization; management styles that encourage participation, flexibility, teamwork, 
problem-solving and equity; clear performance expectations for staff; and managerial autonomy, 
particularly in personnel matters.  
Organizational mission and mystique. Organizational “mystique” arises when workers 
feel that they acquire prestige and a good reputation by working for their organization, and when 
their organization has a reputation for competence, respect and social contribution. Health staff in 
Bolivia reported a high degree of pride in their organization and a personal commitment to 
maintaining its good reputation by contributing to the quality of services delivered (Grindle 
1997). Key elements of this “mission and mystique” factor included a strong sense of service 
among staff; identification with norms and values that were thought to have universal validity 
such as honesty and political non-involvement; a sense that the organization and its employees 
were somehow unique, whether in their practice or the nature of their mission; a sense that staff 
selection was based on competence or skill (and thus, a sense of pride in being part of the 
organization); and absorption of the organization’s mission by staff, making it a personal mission 
as well as an organizational one. These factors were found to be independent of salary scales or 
other remuneration. Promoting the emergence of these factors requires committed leadership and 
explicit action, since they seldom arise de novo. In an example from Brazil, Tendler and 
Freedheim (1994) summarize the use of public information campaigns by provincial government 
to improve the public perception and status of first-level health workers. The campaigns had a 
twofold purpose: they helped health workers feel good about their jobs by conveying a positive 
impression to the community, and they also helped overcome resistance and political capture by    
  15
mid-level governments—in this case local mayors—by publicizing the higher-level government’s 
support of their mission (Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, and Romani 2004). 
Good management. Grindle (1997) identifies four managerial characteristics that are 
correlates of good performance. These included open and non-hierarchical interactions between 
managers and staff; managers who insulate their staff from perverse elements of the institutional 
environment (e.g., rigid civil service rules, political interference or demands for patronage); 
managers’ use of incentives and rewards in a consistent, fair way (even those as simple as 
“employee of the month” recognitions); and managers who encourage teamwork among staff. 
Fairness in the application of rules and distribution of material and non-material rewards is the 
critical factor here. 
Performance expectations. Organizations get the best out of staff when staff realize that 
performance matters. In many developing countries this message is hard to get across; civil 
service rules or political patronage lead to promotions based on seniority or political connections 
rather than merit or performance, and workers therefore have little incentive to perform well. But 
some managers and organizations find ways around this, whether by enforcing strict selection 
criteria (such as examinations or multiple interviews) to impress on candidates the importance of 
quality and performance; using induction periods to communicate organizational norms and 
performance expectations; having clear job descriptions and clear and fairly enforced rules about 
remuneration and promotion; or using probationary periods, time-limited contracts and 
performance reviews linked to clear reward and punishment actions even when these actions are 
not part of general civil service norms. The key message to workers should be that performance 
matters, and that good performance will be rewarded—even if only through recognition or other 
non-pecuniary means—and poor performance punished. 
Managerial autonomy, particularly in personnel matters. For an organization to rise 
above public sector norms, managers need at least some autonomy in personnel matters. 
Managers need the autonomy to advertise and fill vacant positions, promote people on the basis 
of merit and punish those who do not meet performance expectations. This basic autonomy is 
lacking in many developing countries, such as India (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). 
Granting managers discretion over these decisions does not always led to better performance—it 
may actually have the reverse effect if managers use their newly gained authority for private 
benefit—but it does appear to be an important precondition for performance improvement. These 
issues have been discussed already and are not revisited here. 
The problem of context 
Focusing on organizational culture alone will not address the problems of a hostile work 
context. Just as workers aren’t motivated by pay changes alone, they may also fail to respond to 
changes in the organizational micro-climate if the external environment—what Grindle calls the 
“action environment” and others call the institutional context—provides significant barriers to 
action. These problems are pervasive in developing countries and are frequently outside the direct    
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influence of sectoral staff. Civil service rules, procedures and decisions are centralized and rigid, 
limiting innovation and the ability of managers to manage their staff and programs effectively; 
promotions are based on seniority rather than merit; and political interference is common. 
Russell, Bennett, and Mills (1997), surveying the effectiveness of health management reforms in 
five developing countries, draw similar conclusions about the impeding effect of hostile 
organizational climate on managerial change. They point out the difficulty of changing this 
climate given the entrenched nature of existing institutions and the influence of vested interests 
within the public bureaucracy (p. 773). Grindle argues that a focus on organizational culture 
should not substitute for efforts to improve the broader institutional environment. She writes: 
Encouraging the development of characteristics associated with positive organizational 
cultures may be an important way of improving public sector performance where the 
broader economic, social and political environment as well as the public sector in general 
are seriously detrimental to good performance. Clearly, building performance-oriented 
organizational cultures is not a substitute for civil service reform or for changes in the 
institutional context within which public sectors operate in developing countries.... 
however, promoting organizational characteristics that promote positive cultures may be 
the “missing ingredient” in the disappointing results of many civil service reforms. 
(Grindle 1997, p.491) 
However, she further argues that change is possible in such contexts, provided a 
minimum of administrative autonomy is given to public managers and is used to good effect. 
In response to these problems, some countries have experimented by delegating functions 
to parastatal agencies. For example in India, some disease control programs have been delegated 
to semi-autonomous agencies that operate with public money but outside the formal public sector. 
The purpose of these reforms was to unburden program managers from civil service rules, expand 
their autonomy in hiring staff, allocating resources and tailoring programs to local needs, and to 
introduce community oversight by appointing external members to agency boards. Experience 
with these “disease control societies” has been mixed. In some settings autonomy has been 
exercised responsibly and programs have become flexible, effective and locally adapted. In 
others, it has led to more rent-seeking in procurement and a change in the distribution but not the 
extent of patronage. Establishing autonomous agencies can also undermine the coherence of 
government action more broadly as well (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). These 
agencies can destabilize budgets in three ways: first, by creating a constituency for earmarked 
funds that undermines the government’s ability to reallocate resources as priorities change; 
second, by creating so-called bleeding stump scenarios where autonomous agencies hold the 
government to ransom by threatening the unthinkable—e.g., health workers on strike or outbreaks 
ignored—unless additional resources are provided; and third, by creating liabilities for the 
government if agencies borrow against state assets. They can also be used to appease fractious 
coalition members in politically unstable environments, defeating their basic purpose to improve 
service delivery.    
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Accountability 
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of service delivery depends on the extent to which 
those who deliver it are held accountable for their performance. In this section we consider two 
kinds of accountability: hierarchical accountability, which is based on bureaucratic controls 
within government
3; and social accountability, which involves communities in management and 
monitoring of programs (Das Gupta and Khaleghian forthcoming). 
Hierarchical accountability. This involves monitoring the performance of public 
servants, rewarding them for good performance and punishing them when performance is bad. 
This is easier for some services than others. For services where output is easy to measure—the 
number of bricks laid or amount of taxes collected—this type of accountability is relatively 
straightforward. Tax collection reforms in Brazil, Mexico and Ghana bear out this point. In all 
three countries tax collectors were given a pecuniary incentive linked to their productivity in 
collecting taxes, as a result of which collection rates improved dramatically. In other countries, 
pay reforms were used rather than monitoring, the intention here being to reduce corruption by 
“raising the stakes” due to the higher wages which corrupt officials would forfeit if caught. The 
Becker-Stigler theory postulates that these two approaches are interactive, with higher pay and 
higher monitoring intensity both contributing to better performance and reduced corruption 
(Becker and Stigler 1974). Studies of corruption and government performance in several contexts 
confirm the validity of this hypothesis (Mookherjee 2001). 
When measurement is difficult, however, it becomes considerably harder for supervisors 
to monitor and incentivize staff performance—and correspondingly easier for staff to manipulate 
the system in their favor—leading in turn to principal-agent problems and accountability failures. 
This applies to several of the EPHFs. Surveillance, for example, becomes less visible the more 
effectively it is carried out. Without strong internal controls and process measures, the first sign 
of a failing surveillance system is frequently a major outbreak—too late for corrective action. The 
same is true of health promotion. Since the impact of these activities is difficult and expensive to 
measure, evaluations—when they are carried, which they frequently aren’t—are seldom linked 
back to the staff involved in preparing the program in the first place. As a result these staff 
operate in an accountability vacuum and have little incentive to “get it right”. Monitoring can also 
be difficult for other reasons. In the case of health inspection, problems can arise when inspectors 
are expected to survey a large area and there are few supervisors above them. In this context, 
inspectors know that the likelihood of a supervisory check—i.e., the intensity of monitoring— is 
low, and they therefore have little incentive to perform efficiently or honestly, since the 
likelihood of being caught or punished is also low. 
These points have important implications for the use of bonus payments and other ways 
of rewarding good performance. If measurement is weak or imprecise, whether because the 
service in question is hard to monitor or because monitoring is done poorly, it becomes difficult 
                                                      
3 See the citation from Schick (1998) above.    
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for managers to identify good performance and reward it accordingly. In India, for example, 
malaria workers were offered a monetary incentive linked to the number of slides they processed. 
Since monitoring was weak, workers created artificial smears using dog’s blood and used these to 
claim the bonus (Das Gupta and Khaleghian 2002). Mookherjee (2001) writes: 
Even deeper problems arise with respect to defining measures of good performance, 
conditional on which bonuses can be paid. How does one measure the output of a teacher, 
or a policeman? [Designing] such performance metrics is tricky even in the context of 
developed countries, owing to their multidimensional nature, where some dimensions 
more difficult than others to measure. Measuring and rewarding the more measurable 
dimensions may be dysfunctional, since they may cause the official to divert effort 
towards those dimensions that are measured, at the expense of those that are not. For 
instance, if teachers are evaluated are evaluated on the basis of their students’ grades, 
they might then be motivated to redirect their teaching to emphasize examination 
technique at the expense of real learning; in extreme cases even to leak exam questions to 
their students. 
This underscores the complexity and danger of using personalized incentives as a way to 
improve agency performance. (The impact of such incentives on cooperative behavior is also 
relevant, as discussed earlier.) It also highlights the fact that choices about monitoring are the 
product of two countervailing forces: the desire for simplicity, which makes measurement easier 
and cheaper but runs the risk of creating perverse incentives, and the desire for 
comprehensiveness, which creates more accurate incentives but can be costly to implement.  
Here too the institutional context matters. As Mookherjee (2001) writes: 
The difficulty of investigating and establishing the incidence of corruption is 
compounded by civil service norms and legal difficulties in securing dismissal. The worst 
consequence for a tarnished official is frequently transfer to a less lucrative assignment, 
or a temporary suspension for a few months. Transfer policies often tend to be used 
instead by political superiors to reward or punish compliance with their own personal 
agendas, rather than merit based performance. 
Specifically, in settings where political corruption is widespread, monitoring rules are set 
by politicians who have a vested interest in keeping them weak. Shirley and Xu use data from 12 
countries to show how this leads performance-based incentive schemes to fail: 
…the governments negotiating our sample contracts chose to pledge actions that they 
were not motivated or able to implement. Second, with the exception of India, Korea and 
Mexico, the supervisory agencies were not given the capacity to negotiate, monitor and 
evaluate well. Their information advantage was reinforced by other government actions, 
such as giving them low pay and status, frequently moving them within the government, 
and failing to force the SOEs [state-owned enterprises] to comply with their information 
requirements. This allowed managers to manipulate the targets, which proved to be a 
serious failing of all the contracts in our sample. 
What do these points imply for the EPHFs? First, they show that monitoring matters. 
Second, they suggest that monitoring should not focus on outcomes alone, given their distal and 
distant nature, but should instead use carefully chosen proximate measures that can be used to 
monitor performance but are still relevant to the production of outcomes. Third, they highlight the 
potential role of information systems—both HIS and MIS—in providing data inputs for service    
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monitoring. And fourth, they imply that for public health functions and services, broadly based 
performance measures linked to group-wide incentives are probably more effective than highly 
specific measures linked to individual ones.  
Social accountability. Another approach is to make service providers accountable to their 
constituents, either by having community members participate in managing the service or through 
providing them with information, choice, or opportunities to voice their concerns if the service 
fails to meet their expectations. Examples can be divided into interventions dominated by 
community co-management, choice, information, or “voice” mechanisms. 
Community co-management has been a favorite of primary health care enthusiasts since 
the Alma-Ata conference in 1978, where the notion of community participation was given 
prominence. Examples abound: for example, the role of communities in managing service during 
the civil conflict in Panama (Taylor and Taylor-Ide 2000), the emerging role of Panchayati Raj 
Institutions in overseeing health services in India (Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003), the 
important role of communities in Bamako Initiative countries, and the use of community boards 
to oversee public hospitals in some industrialized countries (Hurley, Birch, and Eyles 1995; 
McKee and Healy 2000). Extensive examples can also be found in the education literature, where 
community co-management of schools has received much attention (Mookherjee 2001). The 
basic idea is that community input will improve the quality and local tailoring of services and 
make sure the providers do their job properly. A teacher will find it harder to shirk if community 
members are, in effect, his bosses; likewise a health worker may take a less heavy handed 
approach to her clients if they are involved in decisions regarding pay or promotion. Like political 
decentralization, these approaches are relevant for services where there is a high level of 
community demand—people want a doctor in the clinic and teachers in the local school—and 
monitoring is straightforward. It is less relevant for “invisible” services such as the EPHFs, in 
which communities tend to be less interested because of their public goods characteristics and for 
which continuous monitoring is not a simple process. The arguments here are the same as those 
for decentralization, as summarized earlier.  
The second approach is to expand the range of providers and give consumers a choice 
regarding whom they use: in other words, to create a market for the service. Primary curative care 
is one area where this strategy is commonly used; another is the use of vouchers for primary 
education, both of which are intended to put competitive pressure on providers (doctors, schools) 
and thus improve their quality and responsiveness to client demands. For reasons explained 
earlier, choice mechanisms—and related marketizing reforms—are a poor fit for services that 
have public goods characteristics or significant externalities. They are therefore of little benefit to 
the EPHFs and can actually be quite harmful, as the earlier discussion and the China example of 
Liu and Mills (2002) so clearly show.  
The third approach is to disseminate information about performance or expected 
standards of service delivery. These range from notices on a clinic door to information on test 
scores or procurement prices for basic drugs. In a well-known example in Uganda, a Public    
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Expenditure Tracking Survey revealed that 87 percent of school funds were “leaking”—i.e., 
disappearing—between central government and schools, either into other programs or the pockets 
of corrupt district officials. In response, the government started to publicize the amount of 
monthly transfers to each district in the newspaper and over the radio, and required primary 
schools to post notices on all inflows of funds. A year after starting the program, leakage had 
fallen to 10 percent as district officials and school administrators found themselves under greater 
scrutiny by the public and the media (Reinikka and Svensson 2001). A similar campaign was 
waged by the government of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in response to pharmaceutical price 
escalations that were thought to be a result of corruption in procurement. In this case, the fact that 
the government was collecting information was by itself sufficient to cause prices to fall—
presumably because corrupt officials assumed the data collection would be followed by some sort 
of crackdown (Di Tella and Savedoff 2002). Information-based approaches do not have to be 
government driven. A free press and civil society can also serve similar functions, as Samuel 
Paul’s report cards on public services in Bangalore show (Paul 1998). Here, a NGO collected and 
disseminated information on the performance of public utilities and health providers in urban 
Bangalore. Some improvements in service delivery were reported to follow, though these were 
more prominent in services such as water and power where private demand is high. The media 
also tends to focus on such services. As a result, while outbreaks receive plenty of attention, 
routine service delivery in public health—the day-to-day functions of surveillance, reporting, data 
analysis—receives no attention at all. In India, democracy and a free press help ensure outbreak 
control but not routine disease control, analogous to Sen’s (2000) analysis that they have been 
effective in preventing famines, but remarkably ineffective in preventing chronic malnutrition 
(Das Gupta, Khaleghian, and Sarwal 2003). Thus, relying on informational strategies or the 
media to hold providers accountable for “invisible” services is not, by itself, a complete solution. 
The fourth approach is to provide channels for users to voice their concerns and 
preferences regarding the service. Client surveys are one such approach. In these, client feedback 
to the provider is used to influence service delivery. Another approach is the use of patient 
advocates or other independent bodies to which service users have access and which have formal 
influence with providers. Like the other approaches summarized above, voice channels are most 
effective for private, measurable services such as water supply, irrigation, education and primary 
curative care. For the EPHFs, they are unlikely to work well because people have little direct 
interest in the service—except when it breaks down, when the only accountability that remains is 
ex post and therefore too late—and because measurement is complicated by the nature of the 
services and their lack of visibility. 
These four approaches are interactive and mutually reinforcing. Information can’t 
improve service delivery unless accompanied by some recourse method, whether it be control, 
choice or voice; and no amount of control, choice or voice is useful unless service users have 
reliable, accurate and easily interpreted information about the service they are supposed to 
monitor. These linkages are frequently ignored. In India, the government publishes a service    
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charter that promises a set of minimum standards from government service delivery agencies. But 
until recently the charter provided no information on what people could do if these standards 
aren’t being met, rendering the exercise futile and giving service providers no additional incentive 
to perform (Government of India 2002). The same is also true of simpler strategies: for example, 
a notice of opening hours on a clinic door means nothing unless other methods exist for service 
users to call the doctor to account should he fail to show up. 
Context is also relevant. If a community is invited to manage, say, water or irrigation 
services, it needs the authority to do so effectively. But this authority is not always provided, and 
community boards find themselves delegated with administrative functions but constrained by 
civil service rules, patronage structures or other impediments to the real exercise of control. The 
same could be said of choice, voice and information-based interventions, all of which can be 
compromised by institutional contexts that “stack the deck” in favor of poorly performing 
agencies and their staff. 
What can be learned from these strategies for the EPHFs? On the surface it would seem 
the answer is nothing. All of them seem to work best for services where public demand and 
interest is high, which is not the case with most of the EPHFs. With adaptation, however, the basic 
principles of social accountability can indeed be applied (with the possible exception of choice, 
for reasons described earlier). While accountability to the public may not be effective, 
accountability to civil society organizations with an interest in public health can. This would 
require the presence of such groups in society—whether they be NGOs, academics or others—or 
efforts to create and support them, whether government- or donor-sponsored. It would also 
require institutional changes to allow the exercise of these practices, such as freedom of 
information laws, forums for non-government inputs to be heard and regulations mandating a 
timely government response. For social accountability to work for the EPHFs therefore requires 
two steps: establishing a constituency for the functions themselves, most likely comprised of 
academics but possibly drawing on interested others as well; and establishing institutional 
structures to release and disseminate information, allow the exercise of voice, or formalize co-
management relations in a way that allows accountability to emerge. This represents a fruitful 
area for policy experimentation and an important complement to the more direct methods of 
improving performance described earlier. 
Section III:  Summary of Key Lessons 
  Curative services, preventive services and essential public health functions have 
important distinctions that make it impossible for policy prescriptions and organizational 
forms from one to be applied to the others without substantial adaptation. 
  User fees are not an option for the EPHFs because of their public goods characteristics. 
  Promoting competition among agencies responsible for public health functions does not 
improve efficiency; on the contrary, it impedes collaboration and technical assistance and 
can therefore compromise the effectiveness of activities such as surveillance and health    
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promotion. Organizational reforms that rely on provider competition (such as purchaser-
provider splits) are therefore not applicable to the EPHFs. 
  Contracting works for some services but not others. For preventive services that are 
measurable and discrete, such as immunization or campaign-based programs, contracting 
can be an effective approach—provided there is sufficient government capacity to 
manage the contracts effectively. But for the EPHFs, where measurement is complex, 
expensive and requires strong information systems, contracting imposes transaction and 
monitoring costs that make efficiency gains unlikely and reduce effectiveness. 
  Managerial autonomy is important for the EPHFs as a way of promoting adaptation and 
innovation. It should be introduced cautiously to avoid abuse, but not so cautiously that it 
fails to materialize at all; but it should also be balanced with instruments to ensure an 
appropriate degree of policy and program consistency across units and jurisdictions. 
  Decentralizing the EPHFs is a risky strategy, since local governments have little incentive 
to invest in public goods and systematically neglect them. The EPHFs should either 
remain under central control—with managerial autonomy or other strategies to permit 
local adaptation and responsiveness—or, if already decentralized, should be subjected to 
alternative forms of central oversight and control such as grants-in-aid, earmarked funds 
etc. 
  Decentralization should not be allowed to compromise the strength of central agencies 
responsible for the EPHFs. This often happens as central governments downsize across the 
board, but it can have a strongly negative impact on the EPHFs given the importance of 
central coordination, oversight and technical assistance to these functions. 
  The institutional environment—i.e., the formal and informal rules and norms at work in 
government and society at large—are an influential determinant of government 
effectiveness, including for the EPHFs. 
  Efforts to build management capacity through training are helpful but not sufficient to 
improve managerial effectiveness for the EPHFs, since the latter is heavily influenced by 
rules and norms in the broader institutional environment that can’t be addressed through 
training alone. 
  Public sector norms and rules that impede effective administration should be changed 
where possible. Since these rules are frequently outside the direct influence of sectoral 
officials, alternatives—such as insulating programs from these norms and rules or 
promoting organizational cultures and accountability arrangements that achieve this 
indirectly—should be pursued instead. 
  Provider incentives are complex and difficult to design for the EPHFs and can not be 
simply transferred from the experience with curative care. For incentives to be useful, 
measurement indicators need to be chosen carefully: complex instruments may be 
unworkable and costly, while instruments that are too simple may increase the likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior. Incentives, where used, should be team- or network-based 
rather than individualized and should not neglect the role of non-financial benefits.  
  Performance improvement can also be achieved in more traditional ways, e.g., by having 
fairly implemented merit-based selection and promotion criteria, clear job descriptions 
etc. These should typically be implemented before the adoption of complicated 
performance incentive schemes and may be sufficient by themselves. 
  Strengthening hierarchical accountability within the public health system is essential to 
strengthening the EPHFs. This requires changes in the capacity, autonomy and behavior of    
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service managers (see above) but also requires monitoring systems and instruments that 
are weakly developed at present. 
  Monitoring is critical but instruments to monitor the EPHFs in an operational way are 
weakly developed at present. Instruments need to strike the right balance between 
simplicity and complexity and should be designed for operational rather than research 
use. Outcome measures are not useful for month-to-month program management which 
requires more proximate indicators. Information systems—both HIS and MIS—can 
provide data inputs for this kind of monitoring but are frequently too weak to do so. 
  Standard information and voice-based strategies do not work particularly well for the 
EPHFs but can be adapted to do so. This would involve constituency building for the 
EPHFs and the use of academic, civil society and media groups to monitor and have input 
to decisions concerning them, rather than using private citizens to do so. 
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